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PRESS LAW IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES: A COM-
PARATIVE STUDY. Edited by Pnina Lahav.1 New York: 
Longman Inc. 1985. Pp. xvi, 366. $39.95. 
David A. Anderson2 
This collection of essays on press freedom in seven countries is 
more than the sum of its parts. It is a remarkable demonstration 
that freedom of the press depends less on the laws that protect or 
restrict the press than on the society's values, traditions, culture, 
and political philosophy. In essay after essay, the same message 
leaps off the page: the extent of press freedom in a country does not 
necessarily depend on the language-or even the existence-of a 
constitutional or other fundamental guarantee. 
We have begun to understand this in the United States. Hans 
Linde has shown that "[t]he history of liberty of the press in the 
United States is not the history of the first amendment."3 For the 
first century, it was the state courts, interpreting their own constitu-
tions and the common law, that established the legal bases for press 
freedom in America. 4 The first amendment did not become the pri-
mary basis until well into the twentieth century. Even then, its in-
fluence was not dramatic. The Supreme Court's early first 
amendment decisions merely explained why the Constitution did 
not prevent various restraints on speech.s When the Court finally 
relied upon the amendment to invalidate such a restraint in 1931, in 
Near v. Minnesota,6 it did so by ascribing to the amendment only 
the narrow purpose of preventing prior restraints, and then not in 
all circumstances. To use Linde's words again, "Near added noth-
ing to the substance of free expression; if anything it sacrificed some 
substance to gain its major goal."7 Since then, the Court's role has 
been as much to limit press freedom as to protect it. While creating 
a body of ringing libertarian rhetoric, the Court has allowed the 
government to muzzle the speech of anarchists, socialists, and com-
I. Associate Professor, Boston University School of Law. 
2. Stanley D. Rosenberg Centennial Professor, University of Texas School of Law. 
3. Linde, Courts and Censorship, 66 MINN. L. REV. 171, 207 (1981). 
4. See generally Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L. J. 
514 (1981). 
5. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
6. 283 u.s. 697 (1931). 
7. Linde, supra note 3, at 184. 
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munists;s it generally has refused to protect newsgathering activi-
ties;9 and it has declined to extend the amendment's full protection 
to the most popular medium of communication, broadcasting. to If 
freedom of the press consisted only of those rights that the Supreme 
Court has been able to find in the first amendment, it would be a 
puny freedom. 
Fortunately, the law provides many other sources of press free-
dom. The common law protected against prior restraints even 
before adoption of the first amendment, 11 and it has continued to 
respond to the needs of the press. For example, the common law of 
defamation recognized privileges that protected the press long 
before the Supreme Court saw any need for constitutional limita-
tions on libel law.12 Congress and the state legislatures have nur-
tured the press, through favorable postal rates, 13 exemption from 
antitrust laws,l4 shield statutes, Is sunshine acts and freedom of in-
formation acts.l6 Administratively, government gives the press spe-
cial access to places and officials, and operates a vast public 
information apparatus to meet the press's demands for 
information. 11 
These currents of press freedom flow not from the first amend-
ment or any other fundamental law, but from a deep, powerful, and 
enduring consensus that freedom of the press is a good thing.1s The 
first amendment is not the source of that consensus, only another 
product of it. 
The essays collected in this volume show that it is the existence 
and strength of this social consensus that determines the degree of 
8. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Whitney v. California, 274 
U.S. 357 (1927); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
9. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. I (1978); Nixon v. Warner Communi-
cations, 435 U.S. 589 (1978). 
10. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
II. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *151-52. 
12. See, e.g., Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908). 
13. See 39 U.S.C. § 3626 (reduced postal rates for periodicals). 
14. See Newspaper Preservation Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1801. 
15. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:84A-21 (Supp. 1970); CAL. Evm. CODE § 1070 
(West 1966). 
16. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552; Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552b; Texas Open Meetings Act, TEx. REv. C1v. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17 (Vernon Supp. 
1980). 
Sometimes the legislatures have come to the aid of the press after the courts have refused 
to do so. See, e.g., Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (prohibiting news-
room searches); the statute was enacted after Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), 
in which the Court held that the first amendment did not prohibit such searches. 
17. See, e.g., M. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND Gov-
ERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (1983). 
18. See generally Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 
COLUM. L. REV. 449 (1985). 
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press freedom in any country. The press is often more or less free 
than a study of its press law alone would indicate. The West Ger-
man criminal code contains a number of provisions that look like 
seditious libel. They prohibit public attacks on the President, the 
Federal Republic and its symbols, and the state and federal legisla-
tures and their members.I9 We are assured, however, that in prac-
tice these provisions are "totally unimportant" because the officials 
who might prosecute never do so.2o In Japan, the government 
treats information as confidential unless the government in its dis-
cretion chooses to release it; government employees are forbidden 
from divulging secrets, and a reporter can be prosecuted for induc-
ing a civil servant to do so; yet we are told that there is little de-
mand for freedom of information legislation because the Japanese 
press is so skillful at obtaining information informally.21 France 
has a statute allowing the Minister of the Interior to prohibit distri-
bution of foreign publications, and elaborate mechanisms for re-
viewing the Minister's prohibitions. In the past, this scheme was 
used to ban novels of Henry Miller, books by African writers, and 
even a publication of the Jehovah's Witnesses. Apparently, how-
ever, publishers in recent years have challenged these prohibitions 
more aggressively and have thereby discouraged their use, though 
the law remains in place.22 
Many Americans will be surprised at the diversity of legal ar-
rangements within which a free press can flourish. In West Ger-
many, prior restraints are not only tolerated, but sometimes 
preferred. "The general impression in German legal opinion is that 
'prior restraint' is a nonissue and that it is certainly better to avoid 
harm than to compensate it afterwards. "23 France gives public offi-
cials more protection against defamation than the private citizen 
enjoys.24 Anyone wishing to publish a newspaper in Sweden or 
Israel must first obtain a license from the government.25 Israel has 
a particularly effective way of controlling pretrial publicity: a liti-
gant who uses the press to publicize his cause can have his action 
dismissed.26 The British, in addition to their notorious Official 
Secrets Act, have a system of "D Notices" by which the govern-
ment can effectively suppress publication of information that the 
19. PRESS LAW IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES 202 (P. Lahav ed. 1985) (hereinafter cited 
as PRESS LAW]. 
20. /d. 
21. /d. at 323. 
22. /d. at 155. 
23. /d. at 199. 
24. /d. at 159. 
25. /d. at 234, 271-72. 
26. /d. at 288. 
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government believes would endanger national security.27 
In Sweden, the right of anonymity is a cornerstone of the free 
press scheme. Under the licensing scheme, editors of newspapers 
and magazines must be identified, and must bear ultimate responsi-
bility for the contents of their publications. Authors of books or 
pamphlets and contributors to newspapers and magazines, on the 
other hand, have a right to remain anonymous; coworkers are for-
bidden from revealing their identity and public authorities are pro-
hibited from seeking to discover their identity.2s 
In Japan, Israel, and Sweden, libel is more likely to be treated 
as a criminal matter than as a basis for a civil suit. In Sweden this is 
because no cause of action lies unless the publication also consti-
tutes a crime.29 In Israel and Japan, however, it is because most 
victims prefer the criminal remedy; it provides a quicker and less 
expensive method of vindication.3o 
That a free press can thrive in such different legal environ-
ments ought to give pause to those who announce the death of free-
dom every time the Supreme Court rejects a new press attempt to 
extend the first amendment. 
Of the seven countries treated in the study, the one whose law 
is most repressive of press freedom is Israel. The mechanisms for 
press control available to the Israeli government would make the 
Star Chamber envious. Under the Press Ordinance all publishers 
must obtain a license and post a deposit to guarantee payment of 
fines. The license can be suspended or revoked for violations, but its 
issuance is nondiscretionary. The Defense (Emergency) Regula-
tions, however, require a second permit. Under these the District 
Commissioner has vast discretionary powers, and if he has the good 
sense to refuse to give reasons for his denial of a permit, the denial is 
not judicially reviewable. The result is a system that blatantly dis-
criminates against pro-Arab applicants.3I 
The Israeli government has power to compel newspapers to 
publish official communiques and official denials of material previ-
ously published, though these powers apparently are not used.32 It 
may suspend publication of newspapers that pose a high probability 
of danger to public peace.33 It has broad powers of censorship, and 
the press is forbidden from protesting these; it is a crime to publish 
27. /d. at 16-17. 
28. /d. at 236-37. 
29. Id. at 244. 
30. /d. at 293-94, 330. 
31. /d.at271-72. 
32. Id. at 272. 
33. /d. at 272-73. 
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white space to indicate that material has been deleted by the cen-
sor.34 The censor is even empowered to prohibit the Israeli press 
from republishing news items from abroad; two editors went to 
prison for reprinting a French magazine's story about the involve-
ment of Israeli intelligence officers in the abduction of a Moroccan 
leader, and the Israeli press was forbidden to reveal facts of the case 
to the public.3s The government may designate certain subjects as 
secret, and newspapers then must submit articles on those subjects 
for prior review.36 Seditious libel is a crime; truth is not a defense; 
and the penalty can be termination of the newspaper and blacklist-
ing of the offending individual for three years.37 In private defama-
tion, truth is a defense only if the publication is "of public interest"; 
in order to avail himself of the defense of good faith, the libel de-
fendant must publish the complainant's reply.3s 
Lahav, who is author of the essay on Israel as well as editor of 
the book, struggles to explain the reasons for this repression. She 
sees it as a product of tension between the liberal instincts of en-
lightened Zionism, British constitutionalism, Anglo-American lib-
eralism, and sociological jurisprudence, on the one hand, and 
authoritarian impulses derived from the preemancipation Jewish 
tradition, British colonialism, Continental liberalism, and legal for-
malism on the other.39 It is difficult to accept her conclusion that 
"[t]he commitment to a democratic form of government and to lib-
ertarian values, characteristic of mainstream Zionist thought, has 
proved a sufficiently sturdy base on which a solid free press could 
develop."40 She explains the flagrant discrimination against the 
Arab press on the ground that the latter "consciously and openly 
views itself as an arm of the Palestinian struggle."4t But as she rec-
ognizes elsewhere, the Hebrew press is just as consciously and 
openly an arm of the Zionist movement;42 the discrimination, there-
fore, cannot be explained on the theory that arms of political move-
ments are not "press." Nevertheless, friends who have lived in 
Israel assure me she is correct in asserting that the Israeli press is 
remarkably vigorous in its criticism of those in power, 43 at least as 
long as it stays within the bounds of the Zionist consensus. Even in 
34. ld. at 275. 
35. Id. at 276, 279. 
36. Id. at 276. 
37. ld. at 278. 
38. Id. at 292-93. 
39. ld. at 265-67. 
40. ld. at 298. 
41. ld. 
42. Id. at 275. 
43. Id. at 282. 
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Israel, the press apparently is far more free than the law would lead 
one to expect. 
The Israeli system is only a particularly dramatic illustration of 
a principle that can be seen operating in every country in the study: 
the scope of press freedom is largely determined by the country's 
cultural biases. Israel's system reflects a powerful authoritarian 
streak that is not confined to what Lahav calls "pre-emancipation 
Jewish culture."44 The American system reflects a pervasive suspi-
cion of government; New York Times v. Sullivan 45 only recognized 
a distrust of public officials that was implicit in the American 
scheme from the beginning.46 The British, on the other hand, be-
lieve in government, and particularly in the civil service; this helps 
explain why they tolerate so much official secrecy and refuse to pro-
tect criticism of public officials. 
Press Law in Modern Democracies is divided into three sections 
called "The Anglo-American Approach," "The Continental Ap-
proach," and "The Non-Western Approach." The "non-Western" 
representatives, however, are Israel and Japan, two of the most 
"Western" systems outside the West. Thus the book is really a 
study only of press freedoms in Western democracies and their 
derivatives. 
The book makes no attempt to deal with issues raised by 
broadcasting and newer communications technologies. As the Ger-
man contributor notes, the questions most frequently discussed in 
Germany today are not those addressed by this book, but those in-
volving regulation of the electronic media;47 that is probably true in 
the other countries as well. 
Inevitably, language proves to be a problem; translation from 
the French produces the quaint observation that "(f]or the press, 
seizure is definitively harmful."4s Multiplicity of authors is an en-
emy of timeliness; although the book is dated 1985, one of the es-
says apparently was completed before the end of 1983.49 
Despite these flaws, it is an unusual and valuable book. 
Wisely, Lahav recognizes that freedom of the press issues are pretty 
much the same everywhere. Once a state vows fealty to the ideal of 
a free press, the questions all revolve around the extent to which 
that ideal must yield: to the security interests of the state, to the 
individual's interests in reputation and privacy, and to other social 
44. !d. at 266. 
45. 376 u.s. 254 (1964). 
46. See Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455 (1983). 
47. PRESS LAW, supra note 19, at 218. 
48. /d. at 157. 
49. !d. at 251. 
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goals such as fair administration of justice, governmental efficiency, 
and diversification of media voices. This is the organizing principle 
of each essay. Each contributor describes how the law in his coun-
try attempts to deal with each of those issues. The essays are more 
than merely descriptive, however; they also evaluate each country's 
response. The conclusions vary widely, from the Englishman 
Michael Supperstone's harsh indictment of his country's penchant 
for secrecyso to Masao Horibe's assurance that "Japan is certainly a 
paradise for the press."s1 What is valuable, however, is not the es-
sayists' opinions. Rather, it is that by asking them to evaluate as 
well as describe, Lahav has forced each of them to play Tocqueville 
in reverse: to interpret for a stranger not only his own country's 
laws, but its practices as well. 
Nowhere does this strategem produce a happier result than in 
Aviam Soifer's essay on press freedom in the United States. It is 
one of those pieces-like Chafee's review of Meiklejohn's books2 or 
Kalven's note on New York Times v. Sullivans3-that accomplishes 
far more than the modest purpose for which it was written. Soifer 
begins by asserting that "[f]reedom of the press in the United States 
is much more than a legal concept-it is almost a religious tenet."s4 
He attributes the broad freedom enjoyed by the American press 
more to the beliefs of the American people than to the press's suc-
cess in litigation. 55 Americans tend to invoke the first amendment 
"in ways that are partially mythic and largely symbolic."s6 He 
points out, for example, that even with respect to prior restraints, 
first amendment doctrine provides no sure protection; the Pentagon 
Papers Case left open the possibility that Congress might authorize 
prior restraints,s7 and Nebraska Press Association v. Stuartss en-
dorses a process of judicial balancing in prior restraint cases. Nev-
ertheless, "symbolic pronouncements and legal precedents still 
create an unusually strong presumption against imposition of judi-
cial restraints prior to publication."s9 Soifer makes precisely the 
right point: whatever doctrinal doubts may remain, the reality is 
that the Nixon administration, at the height of its power, could not 
50. /d. at 12-17. 
51. /d. at 334. 
52. Chafee, Book Review, 62 HARV. L. REv. 891 (1949). 
53. Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First 
Amendment", 1964 SUP. Cr. REV. 191. 
54. PRESS LAW, supra note 19, at 79. 
55. /d. 
56. !d. at 80. 
57. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
58. 427 u.s. 539 (1976). 
59. PRESS LAW, supra note 19, at 101. 
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restrain publication of secrets that it (and the Court) believed posed 
a serious threat to national security. 
Soifer does not ignore the corollary, that restrictions on press 
freedom can also have symbolic importance. Recent decisions al-
lowing the government to censor the writings of former intelligence 
agents "may not establish doctrine which goes beyond their special 
facts,"60 he says, but the Court's brusque treatment of the agents' 
constitutional arguments makes it clear that the Court is willing to 
put security ahead of first amendment concerns.6I 
Soifer acknowledges that first amendment jurisprudence ebbs 
and flows, depending upon the temper of the times and the election 
returns. But he also notes that "[t]o some extent, freedom of ex-
pression in the United States seems to exert its own pressure-al-
most to enjoy a symbolic life of its own-no matter who controls 
the apparatus of government."62 
Soifer's essay is also full of smaller but no less valuable in-
sights. He observes in passing that because the states are the most 
important source of law for most citizens, the Court's offhand dic-
tum in Gitlow v. New York,63 applying first amendment standards to 
the states, "must rank among the most significant legal victories for 
freedom of expression in the United States."64 His footnotes are a 
bibliography of virtually everything worthwhile ever written about 
the first amendment, by judge or scholar. 
For all of his emphasis on the nondoctrinal aspects of the first 
amendment, Soifer does not ignore its importance as law. He un-
derstands that the very existence of a legal theory, even if it is not 
fully accepted, can have an effect. For example, though the Court 
has not accepted the theory that reporters have a first amendment 
right to refuse to disclose confidential sources, neither has it rejected 
the theory outright.65 As a result, 
law enforcement personnel and judges still do not casually order journalists to dis-
close confidential sources or similar information. They know that they are likely to 
become involved in time-consuming and expensive legal battles, and that many ap-
pellate courts require a strong showing of necessity for the information sought and a 
lack of alternative sources for the same information. 66 
Throughout the essay, Soifer recognizes the inseparability of 
the constitutional text from the values that it embodies. The text 
60. !d. at 108. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 90. 
63. 268 u.s. 652 (1925). 
64. PRESS LAW, supra note 19, at 84. 
65. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
66. PRESS LAW, supra note 19, at 113. 
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cannot create freedom of expression if the society lacks a passionate 
commitment to that ideal. The French equivalent of a press 
clause67 is almost identical to that of Pennsylvania and several other 
American states;6s the relative lack of press freedom in France re-
sults not from a defective text, but from French ambivalence toward 
the idea of a truly free press. As Lahav notes, England, despite its 
lack of a constitutional commitment to a free press, is quite protec-
tive of the press, while France retains an authoritarian approach 
despite its formal commitment to the ideal. 69 
On the other hand, even the strongest libertarian instincts need 
the support of a text. As Soifer puts it, "To possess constitutional 
language considered fundamental and to be able to invoke an elo-
quent legal and philosophical tradition explicating the need for an 
unfettered press is important."7o 
Soifer writes only of the United States, but the comment could 
as well be a summary of the entire study. In all democratic socie-
ties, at least, freedom of the press is a product not merely of the 
country's constitution, or even of its entire body of press law, but of 
the position that freedom of expression occupies in its hierarchy of 
values. 
6 7. Article 11 of the Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789 states: "The 
unrestrained communication of thoughts and opinions, being one of the most precious rights 
of man, every citizen may speak, write, and publish freely, provided he be responsible for any 
abuse of this liberty in those cases determined by law." Under the French Constitution of 
1958, this declaration has the force of a constitutional guarantee. See PRESS LAW, supra note 
19, at 139. 
68. See PA. CONST. art. I §7; other state constitutions with similar clauses are cited in 
Anderson, supra note 46, at 488 n.200. 
69. PRESS LAW, supra note 19, at 345. 
70. /d. at 80. 
